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C. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to
§ 78-2a-3(2) (j) , Utah Code.

The pour over into this Court is

pursuant to Rule 4A(a), R. Utah S. Ct.

See also Rule 3 and 4,

R. Utah Ct. App.

D. Nature of Proceedings

This

is an appeal from the order

granting

a Writ of

Restitution to plaintiff/respondent Olympus Hills and evicting
defendant/appellant Wasatch Bowling.

It was poured over into

this Court by the Utah Supreme Court.

E.

Statement of Issues on Appeal

I.
In an action sounding unlawful detainer for nonpayment of
rent, may the court award judgment of restitution based upon
other grounds (e.g. common law breach of contract)?
II. Where an action is begun with a complaint and three day
summons in unlawful detainer, and where subsequent payments have
exceeded the amount originally sought/ is it error to grant
restitution without requiring a new unlawful detainer notice?

- vi -

III. Is it error for the court to certify a partial judgment
for appeal when judgment is not yet granted as to other relief
sought in the same claim for relief and cause of action?
IV.

Was it error to require two supersedeas bondsf and was the

amount excessive?
V. Was it error for the court to issue its Writ of Restitution
without a written order determining the sufficiency of the
supersedeas bonds?

F.

Determinative statutes

The statutes and rules which Wasatch believes may be
determinative

are copied

or set forth

in their

entirety in

Appendix I hereto.

STATEMENT OF CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from partial summary judgment granting
to Plaintiff-Respondent

Olympus

Hills

["Olympus"] a Writ of

Restitution, evicting defendant-appellant Wasatch Bowling, Inc.
["Wasatch"] from possession of a bowling alley.
Writ was certified as immediately appealable.

Granting the

Stay of the writ

to allow continued possession pending appeal was was refused
because

the trial

supersedeas bonds.

court

only

approved

one of two $300,000

B.

Course of Proceedings

Olympus served Wasatch with a three day notice to pay
rent or quit, and sued Wasatch December 31, 1987 (a few weeks
later).

The complaint contained a single claim for relief,

alleging default under a bowling alley lease in the amount of
nearly

$17,000.

detainer

R.

1-4.

The

complaint

alleged

unlawful

of the premises commencing December 8, 1987, asking

treble damages therefor, R. 3, and sought restitution of the
premises, citing specifically to the unlawful detainer chapter
in the Utah Code.
The action was commenced by a summons (served January 5,
1987)

with

the

response

time

shortened

to

authority of the unlawful detainer statute.

three

days, by

R. 50, 55-56.

Olympus moved to amend its complaint nearly a year later,
on

December

acknowledged

20, 1988.
that

the

Agreement June 20, 1988
Amended Complaint).

R.

89-91.

parties
(after

R. 92.

had

The

Amended

entered

into

Complaint
a

Letter

the Complaint and before the

A copy of the Letter Agreement is

attached hereto as Appendix II.
Wasatch objected to the amended complaint, asserting that
(R. 97-98):
1.

The

action was

commenced

as

one

of

unlawful

detainer, with a three days summons, but
2.

The proposed amendment appeared to abandon that
- viii -

claimf and to sue instead for breach of contract/ so
3.

Plaintiff could not now convert it into a general

lawsuit for damages.
The
pleading.

amendment
R. 95-96.

was

permitted

and

is

the

operative

A copy of it is attached as Appendix III.

It still asserted a single claim for relief or cause of action/
alleging defaulted lease installments under both the original
lease and the Letter Agreement.

The Amended Complaint claimed

that Olympus was entitled to immediate

restitution under the

terms of the original lease "as amended."

It sought judgment of

$140/990.54.

R. 91.

Unlike the original complaint/ it did not

cite to the unlawful detainer statute.
Olympus

moved

almost

immediately

for

partial

summary

judgment, limited to a request for restitution of the premises
and eviction of Wasatch.
Olympus

simply

recited

R. 104-105.
that

the

In support of the motion

lease

and

Letter

Agreement

existed/ and that Wasatch had defaulted on its payments.
106-107.
for

R.

No authority was cited/ and the only ground set forth

restitution

original lease.

of

the

R. 107.

premises

was

Section

24.01

of

the

Unlawful detainer statutes were not

mentioned.
Wasatch responded/

asserting

(among other things) that

Section 24.01 of the lease was superseded by the later Letter
Agreement.

R. 113-115.

- IX -

C.

Disposition at Trial

After oral argument April 1 4 , partial summary judgment
was

granted

without

trial

April

28/

1989.

The

order

(R.

151-152/ attached as Appendix IV) awarded restitution of the
premises to Olympus and evicted Wasatch.
54(b) the order was
appeal.

certified

And pursuant to Rule

as final/ requiring

immediate

Id.
No

evidenciary

hearing

was

held/

and

therefore

no

citation to a transcript is necessary or possible.
Wasatch filed its Notice of Appeal May 26/ 1989.

A Writ

of Restitution was issued May 30/ R. 184-185/ and again June
28th (after disputes over supersedeas bonds).

D.

R. 251-252.

Bond Procedings

Wasatch filed a $50/000 supersedeas bond on May 26thr and
moved

for

its approval

(R.156-59).

Olympus excepted to the

bond/ R. 161-162. Wasatch justified its surety.
On June 6 Judge Daniels
approved

a

$100/000

supersedeas

R. 171-176.

(sitting for Judge Wilkinson)
bond of Rancho Lanesf Inc.f

subject to Olympus' right to require justification.

R. 177-178.

Upon justification/ Judge Daniels on June 15th rejected
the surety proposed by Wasatch as being too low, and required
two sureties (unless a licensed/ professional surety was used)/
each bound in the amount of $300/000.

R. 205-207.

Two bonds

were filed

in that amount.

R. 189-193f

210-215.

Financial

statements showing the worth of the sureties were filed.
232-236.

R.

The sureties were again challenged by Olympus.

On June 20 by minute entry Judge Wilkinson ordered: "the
Court approves the bonds filed by the defendant and a corporate
surety bond shall be filed in place of the personal bonds by
June 22nd."

R. 243.

No written order was entered.

On June 26 the court heard Olympus1 latest exceptions to
Wasatch's

sureties.

Its minute entry

states that the court

"finds the bonds filed by Rancho and Morris are acceptable but
are not sufficient to meet the obligation.

(H)The court orders

the defendant post a surety bond of $300,000 by 12:00 noon June
27th,

the

sheriff

can

be

in

standby

position

to

take the

property. Defendant's counsel's request to pay the rental is
denied."

R. 244.

Again, the file reflects no written order.

Despite the vagueness of the minute entry, the sum and
substance is that Rancho Lanes, Inc. had appeared at the hearing
and satisfied the court it was worth the $300,000 bond it had
filed.

The court required a second bond, which had been filed

by Mr. Morse.

Although his financial statement and affidavit

showed a net worth in excess of $2.4 million (R. 246-250), the
court refused to accept the bond because he was unable to appear
at the appropriate time to be cross examined by Olympus.
On June 29, 1989, despite the supersedeas bonds filed and
without

a current

written

order, the Writ

served and the locks changed.

R. 257.

of

Execution was

E.

Relevant Facts

Olympus Hills leased bowling alley space to Wasatch in
September, 1984.
were

defaulted

dishonored.

Certain payments by appellants under the lease
upon

and/or

checks

for

such

payments

were

This action was filed as one for unlawful detainer.

Over a year after the complaint was filed (about July 13, 1988),
the parties reached an agreement modified and in part superseded
the prior agreement and the conditions which existed at the time
of the filing of the complaint, as to payment terms, amounts,
etc.

Appendix II.
Respondent moved for partial summary judgment, which is

the

order

opposition.

granted

by

the

trial

court

over

appellant's

The trial court ruled there was no just reason for

delay and made the partial judgment final as to the eviction
issues.

- xn -

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Utah's
remedies.

unlawful

detainer

statute

offers

quick,

harsh

Its use and applicability must be narrowly permitted

to the specified circumstances.
This case began as an unlawful detainer action.

Many

months later, the entire relationship of the parties was altered
by

agreement.

complaint

was

Restitution.

Still
amended

several
and

more

months

Olympus

after

received

that, the

its

Writ

of

A new action at common law, or at least a new

unlawful detainer action, was necessary.
Olympus having asserted only one claim for relief, the
court could not purport to certify only part of the lawsuit for
appeal.

And the supersedeas bonds on file should not have been

disregarded, nor should two of them have been required.

ARGUMENT

1.

Unlawful detainer remedies are harsh.

This case,

where a large, ongoing bowling business was destroyed by Writ of
Restitution, is a classic example.

2.
Court

have

The unlawful detainer act must be strictly construed.
recognized

this because of

its harshness.

Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964).

Van
Once

having commenced the action as one for unlawful detainer, the

applicable statute

(Chapter 36, Title 78, Utah Code) must be

complied with to the letter.

3.
action.

The Letter Agreement changed the whole face of the
Appendix I constitutes a second agreement, executed

long after the unlawful detainer action was filed, under which
Wasatch was permitted to remain in possession.

Since continued

possession was allowed and the lease amount altered, it is clear
that

the

three

subsequent

day

three

day

notice

to

unlawful

pay

rent

detainer

or

quit,

summons

and
had

the
been

superseded.
Later

the court erroneously permitted Olympus to amend

its complaint, excising all references to the unlawful detainer
statute, asserting breach of the lease agreement and the letter
agreement.

Despite the Letter

Agreement, passage of a year

since the three day notice, and the absence of a forfeiture
clause

in the Letter

Agreement, the amended

complaint still

sought restitution.

4.
Wasatch.
for

Without a forfeiture clause, Olympus cannot evict
As stated, the Letter Agreement contained new terms

payment

of

rent.

Some amounts were paid

and accepted

pursuant to the agreement, and Wasatch was allowed to remain in
possession.

No forfeiture was provided for in the letter, nor

did it incorporate the forfeiture clause of the original lease.
In fact, the Letter Agreement provides that it shall run
for two years, after which the lease agreement kicks back in.
See Appendix I, R. 89.

A forfeiture clause may allow termination of a leasehold
prior to its term.

However, here the term is contained in the

Letter Agreement/ and only after it runs its two year course in
mid-1990 does the forfeiture clause arguably apply.
In the absence . . .
of an express forfeiture
provision/ the lessor's remedy is generally a claim
for damages. This is true whether the breach is
for nonpayment of rent/ nonpayment of taxes/ waste/
etc.
Hackford v. Snowy 657 P.2d 1271/ 1275 (Utah 1982).

The Letter

agreement reaffirmed the validity of the leasef and Wasatch1s
rights under it.
Since there was no applicable forfeiture clause/ Olympus
(and

the court) must

rely upon a statutory

remedy to evict

Wasatch for violation of the Letter Agreement.
Lambert v. Siney

123 Utah 145/ 256 P.2d

241

Id. at 1275;
(1953).

This

appeal is hampered by the fact Olympus did not make clear the
authority under which forfeiture was sought.
Any attempt to comply with the special requirements for
an

unlawful

before

the

reaffirmed

detainer
parties
the

eviction
entered

lease.

was

into

Attempted

accomplished
the

Letter

compliance

many

months

Agreement
was

even

and
more

distant in time from any breach of that new agreement.

5.

Statutory

eviction

required

proper

notices

demands.
The basis of a suit in unlawful detainer is
unlawful possession/ and a tenant . . . is not
holding unlawfully until he fails to comply with
the demands of a notice which has been served upon
him.

and

Carstensen v. Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944), quoted
in Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d

1271, 1275

(Utah 1982)-

notice provisions must be strictly complied with.
1276.

In that

case, a statutorily

The

Hackford at

correct notice did not

suffice to put the lessee in unlawful detainer, since it came at
the wrong time.

The lessee had exercised an option to purchase

two months earlier.

6.

Id.

The notices must be correct and timely.

See, Id.;

Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964).
They were served a year early.

To hold that any method of

eviction other than that required by the statute would be to
nullify

the

intent of

the legislature.

See, Carstensen v.

Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944) (regarding improper
service of notice);

Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d

446 (1954).
A statute upon which Olympus must rely states in part:
. . If the unlawful detainer charged is after
default in the payment of rent, the complaint shall
state the amount of rent due.
The court shall
indorse on the summons the number of days within
which
the
defendant
is
required
to appear
and defendant the action. . . .
§ 78-36-8, Utah Code.
restitution

after

default

Here the amended

complaint asks for

in the payment of

rent.

Yet the

complaint was filed before the Letter Agreement on which default
was claimed was even signed. And the only indorsement on the
summons also took place at that early date.

The tenant for a

term of years can only be guilty of unlawful detainer if he

continues in possession . . . after default in the
payment of rent and after notice in writing
requiring in the alternative the payment of the
rent or the surrender of the detained premises, has
remained uncomplied with for a period of three days
after service, which notice may be served at any
time after the rent becomes due.
§ 78-36-3(1)(c), Utah Code (emphasis supplied),
Olympus1 procedure, allowed by the trial court, prevented
Wasatch from enjoying its statutory right to cure after notice,
which could only be served after the rent became due.

The

legislature clearly intended that even defaulting tenants have
those

specific

rights

before

their

homes

concerns may be summarily forfeited.

or

going

business

Olympus cannot sue and

give its notices once, settle with the tenant, and then tack
prior

compliance

with

the

statute

onto

future

defaults

in

different amounts under a new or modified agreement.
Here the amended complaint claimed about ten times the
amount

of

unpaid

rent

which

was

complaint just a year earlier.

alleged

in

the

original

As indicated, to achieve an

unlawful detainer eviction "the complaint shall state the amount
of rent due."

§ 78-36-8, Utah Code.

A complaint so notifying

the court and the tenant, after appropriate statutory notice of
the amount due, is required.

That did not occur here.

Wasatch alleged that the payments made to Olympus after
the initial unlawful detainer complaint was filed exceeded the
nearly

$17,000 alleged default at that time.

should

have been had, since

further
summons.

nullifies

the first

R. 80.

if this allegation
three day

notice

Trial

is true, it

and

three day

7.

Olympus

restitution.
the months

accepted

rent,

Olympus accepted from
of

April

waiving

its

right

to

Wasatch rent payments for

and May, 1989, following

the April 14

argument on partial summary judgment of restitution (but before
the order was signed).

See, R. 216.

Olympus delayed 14 days

in getting the court to sign the order of eviction, and 47 days
before causing a writ of restitution to issue.

Such actions

constitute a waiver of the restitution to which Olympus may have
been entitled.
Continued acceptance of rent constitutes, as a matter of
law, at lease a new month to month rental, possession of under
which could be terminated only after a fifteen day notice under
§ 78-36-3(2), Utah Code.

8.
appeal.

The restitution order was improperly certified for
When the order was entered permitting Olympus to evict

Wasatch, Judge Wilkinson ruled that pursuant to Rule 54(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, there was "no just reason for
delay" and directed the partial judgment be entered as a "final
judgment."

Yet in the same order he specified that the court

may determine the amount of rent and other expenses due at a
later date.

R. 151-152.

This gratuitous certification for appeal was not even
requested in Olympus' motion or memoranda (though it was sought
orally, and opposed by Wasatch).
Judge

Wilkinson's

rejection

of

Its effect, together
supersedeas

bonds,

with

insured

Olympus would be able to throw Wasatch out immediately, without

a

chance

to

fully

determine

the

respective

rights

of

the

parties.

9*
claim.

Judgment may not be final as to part of a single
Neither

the

summary

judgment

rule nor

certification for appeal would permit that.
& (d) , URCP.
of

only

detainer.

Rules 54(b), 56(c)

The

amended

complaint

still

one cause of action: common law breach of the

Letter Agreement and lease.

10.

rule on

Here the complaint stated only one claim or cause

action: unlawful

alleged

the

R.

89-91.

Only separate "claims" may be certified.

The Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim or third-party claim . . . , the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims . . . only
upon an express determination by the court that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In
the absence of such determination and direction,
any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the
claims . . . shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims . . . and the order or other form
of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims. • • •
54(b), URCP.
The rule may only have effect when more than one claim
for

relief

is presented.
not

Here the complaint was short and

general,

and was

divided

into more

than one claim for

relief.

Rule 18(a), URCP likewise distinguishes plaintiffs1

"claims".

Olympus not having chosen to separate its complaint

(even as amended) into more than one claim for relief/ cannot
receive the benefit of piecemeal certification.
If

the

certification

was

improper,

no

part

of

the

judgment would have been final/ and Wasatch would have remained
in possession until full adjudication of the parties' respective
rights.

Rule 54(b), URCP.

11.

The trial court does not have unbridled discretion.

It must find separate claims, and that there is no just reason
for delay.

Merely reciting the criteria have been met does not

mean there

is a final judgment.

otherwise.

Little v. Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979).

This Court may still find
An

order that does not wholly dispose of a "claim" will not be
"final".

Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984);

Backstrom

Family Ltd. Ptnrshp v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah App.

1988) .
Where liability has been determined but the extent of
damage has not, there is no final order for appellate review.
Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986).
Olsen added that this is also true when the trial court's order
disposes of a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief but
leaves unresolved other equitable and legal claims for relief.

12.

The trial court should have recognized Wasatch's

supersedeas bond.

As indicated in the preliminary sections of

this brief, the court first approved a single bond in the amount

of

$100,000.

R.

177-178.

sureties were required.

Later

a $300,000 bond and two

They were filed, but the court found

one was not properly justified.

Though it approved one of the

$300,000 bonds, the court refused to stay judgment without two,
and put Wasatch out of the premises and out of business.
Rent was only $2,750 per month under the original lease,
and by the time judgment was entered it had been reduced by
agreement to $2,500, including common area maintenance.
Amended Complaint, R. 89-92.

See

So if the appeal lasted a year the

loss to Olympus for Wasatch to remain in possession would be
$30,000.

Even a two year appeal would not exceed the $100,000

bond, much less $300,000.
The

court

increased

the bond

requirement

to

$300,000

based upon Olympus1 claim that if Wasatch were allowed to stay,
a new bowling tenant would be lost and the building would need
to be rebuilt.

Wasatch pointed out that even if that assumption

were valid, the rebuilt structure would benefit Olympus in the
amount of its value increase, which would be an offset to any
loss.

R. 216, 218.

It is hard to determine the court's reason

for requiring double sureties.

13.

Judgment

should have been stayed, since Wasatch

provided proper security.

A stay of post judgment proceedings

may be granted upon "such conditions for the security of the
adverse party as are proper."

Rule 62(a), URCP.

Once a bond

had been filed exceeding two years lost rent, "proper" security
had been provided.

Later having determined that one surety was

worth the $300,000 bond required, security was more than proper.
Yet no stay was granted.

14.
required.

Once the bond was approved by the court, a stay was
As indicatedf the $300,000 bond of Rancho Lanes, Inc.

was approved in all respects.

See R. 243-244.

The rule states:

When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving a
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a
stay is otherwise prohibited by law or these rules.
. . . The stay is effective when the supersedeas
bond is approved by the court.
Rule 62(d), URCP.

Since a bond was approved, stay should have

been in effect and no Writ of Restitution should have issued.

15.

Two sureties should not have been required.

Wasatch

has been unable to locate any authority for the court's decision
to require two sureties, each in the maximum amount requested by
Olympus.

The proceedings for excepting to and justifying the

sureties is provided by Rule 62(i).

A portion provides:

In all cases where the bond required exceeds $2,000
and there are more than two sureties thereon, they
may state in their affidavits that they are
severally worth the amounts for which they agree to
be found if less than that expressed in the
undertaking,
provided
the
whole
amount
is
equivalent to that of two sufficient sureties.
62(i),

URCP.

So

the party

seeking

the stay may

multiple sureties, but is not required to do so.
only used when the initial bond

cummulate

Cummulation is

is not by itself worth the

required amount.

16.

Appellate rules have inadvertently omitted standards

for supersedeas bonds. While Rule 62, URCP allows a supersedeas

bond, it provides no help as to what constitutes a "proper"
security.
deleted

Rule 73(d),

with

the

URCP provided

adoption

of

the

the standard, but was

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure (now Rules of the Supreme Court and Rules of the Court
of Appeals) effective 1985.

However, the new rules fail to

properly cover the subject.
Rule 8 of both

appellate courts allows stays pending

appeal, stating only that it "may be conditioned upon the filing
of a bond or other appropriate security in the district court."
Rule 8(b), R. Utah S. Ct.; Rule 8(b), R. Utah Ct. App.

There is

no further provision relating to supersedeas bonds, except to
state that no cost bond is required where a supersedeas bond has
been filed.

Rule 6, R. Utah S. Ct.; Rule 6, R. Utah Ct. App.

Supreme Court Clerk Geoffery Butler has acknowledged in
conversation

with

counsel

that

through

inadvertence,

the

codifiers of the new appellate rules omitted the provisions of
the former Rule 73(d), which are as follows:
(d)
Supersedeas bond.
Whenever an appellant
entitled thereto desires a stay on appeal, he may
present to the court for its approval a supersedeas
bond which shall have such surety or sureties as
the court requires. The bond shall be conditioned
for the satisfaction of the judgment in full
together with costs, interest and damages for
delay, if for any reason the appeal is dismissed or
if the judgment is affirmed, and to satisfy in full
such modification of the judgment and such costs,
interest, and damages as the appellate court may
adjudge and award. When the judgment is for the
recovery of money not otherwise secured, the amount
of the bond shall be fixed at such sum as will
cover the whole amount of the judgment remaining
unsatisfied, costs on the appeal, interest, and
damages for delay, unless the court after notice
and hearing and for good cause fixes a different
amount or orders security other than the bond.
When the judgment determines the disposition of the

property on controversy as in real actions,
replevin, and actions to foreclose mortgages or
when such property is in the custody of the sheriff
or when the proceeds of such property or a bond for
its value is in the custody or control of the
court, the amount of the supersedeas bond shall be
fixed at such sum only as will secure the amount
recovered for the use and determination of the
property, the costs of the action, costs on
appeal, interest, and damages for delay.
Former Rule 73(d), URCP (1984).
The above standard clearly limits the amount the court
may require of a supersedeas bond and surety.

Here the trial

judge overstepped those bounds.

17.

The

jurisdiction.

appellate

rules did

not

alter

the court's

The Supreme Court and Court of Appeals rules make

it clear that the codifiers intended to simply move the appeals
rules from

the Rules of Civil Procedure to the Court's new

rules, with only minor modifications.
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules
shall not be construed to extend or limit the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as established by
law.
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules
shall not be construed to extend or limit the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as established
by law.
Rule 1(d), R. Utah S. Ct.; 1(d), R. Utah Ct. App.
Since no other procedure is specified, the Court should
apply the standard under pre-existing law, unless there is some
indication the standard was abandoned intentionally or replaced
by a new one.

Under that standard, the supersedeas bond amount

is limited to the rental value of the property, interest, costs
and damages.

There would have been no money judgment stayed,

onlv Dossession.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in allowing judgment in the action,
begun as one for unlawful detainer, without requiring the proper
statutory notices to be served again.

The certification for

appeal was improper, and restitution should have been stayed
upon filing of Wasatch's supersedeas bond.
Wasatch

requests

that

the

trial

court's

ruling

be

reversed, and that it be required to issue a new order restoring
Wasatch to possession of the bowling alley.
Respectfully

so

requested

this

15th day

of December,

1989.

Ronald C. Barker
Mitchell R. Barker
Attorneys for Appellant
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CHAPTER 36
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
Section
78-36-1.
78-36-2.
78-36-3.

"Forcible entry" defined.
"Forcible detainer" defined.
Unlawful detainer by tenant for term
less than life.
78-36-4.
Right of tenant of agricultural lands to
hold over.
78-36-5.
Remedies available to tenant against
undertenant.
78-36-6.
Notice to quit — How served.
78-36-7.
Necessary parties defendant
78-36-8.
Allegations permitted in complaint —
Time for appearance — Service of
summons.
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff— Alternative remedies.
78-36-9.
Proof required by plaintiff — Defense.
78-36-10.
Judgment for restitution, damages, and
rent — Immediate enforcement —
Treble damages.
78-36-11.
Time for appeal.
78-36-12.
Exclusion of tenant without judicial process prohibited — Abandoned premises excepted.
78-36-12.3. Definitions.
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking and
rerenting by owner — Liability of tenant — Personal property of tenant left
on premises.
78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either:
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other
parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or
stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances of terror, enters upon or into any real
property; or,
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force, threats or menacing conduct the party in actual possession.
1863

78-36-2. "Forcible detainer" defined.
Every* person is guilty of a forcible detainer who
either:
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession
of any real property, whether the same was acquired peaceably or otherwise; or,
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of
the occupants of any real property, unlawfully
enters thereon, and, after demand made for the
surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three
days to surrender the same to such former occupant. The occupant of real property within the
meaning of this subdivision is one who within
five days preceding such unlawful entry* was in
the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such
lands.

1953

78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term
less than life.
( D A tenant of real property, for a term less than
life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it,
after the expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified
term or period, whether established by express or

implied contract, or whether written or parol
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period:
(b) when, having leased real property for an
indefinite time with monthly or other periodic
rent reserved
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the end of any
month or period, in cases where the owner,
his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner. 15 days or more prior to
the end of that month or period, has served
notice requiring him to quit the premises at
the expiration of that month or period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he
remains in possession of the premises after
the expiration of a notice of not less than five
days;
(c) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, after default m the payment of
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the
surrender of the detained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three
days after service, which notice may be served at
any time after the rent becomes due:
(d* when he assigns or sublets the leased
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease,
or commits or permits waste on the premises, or
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or when he suffers,
permits, or maintains on or about the premises
any nuisance, and remains in possession after
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit;
or
tei when he continue? in possession, in person
or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held.
other than those previously mentioned, and after
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the
surrender of the property, served upon him and
upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the
premises remains uncomplied with for three days
after service. Within three days after the service
of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the
term, or other person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or covenant and
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be performed, then no notice need be given.
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a
mobile home is determined under Chapter 16. Title
57, Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
I»HH

78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to
hold over.
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands.
where the tenant has held over and retained possession for more than 60 days after the expiration of his
term without any demand of possession or notice to
quit by the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, and shall be entitled to hold under the
terms of the lease for another full year, and shall not
be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year,
and the holding over for the 60-day period shall be
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taken and construed as a consent on the part of the
tenant to hold for another year.
1981
78-36-5.

R e m e d i e s available to tenant against
undertenant.
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those
prescribed in this chapter to obtain possession of the
premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful
detention of the premises underlet to him.
1953
78-36-6. Notice t o quit — H o w served.
The notices required by the preceding sections may
be served:
(1) bv delivering a copy to the tenant personally;
(2) by sending a copy through registered or
certified mail addressed to the tenant at his place
of residence;
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or
from his usual place of business, by leaving a
copy with a person of suitable age and discretion
at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant
at the address of his place of residence or place of
business: or
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place of residence, then by
affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the
leased property. Service upon a subtenant may
be made in the same manner.
1987
78-36-7. N e c e s s a r y parties defendant.
No person other than the tenant of the premises,
and subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation
of the premises when the action is commenced, need
be made a party defendant in the proceeding, nor
shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might
have been made a party defendant; but when it appears that any of the parties served with process or
appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment
must be rendered against them. In case a person has
become subtenant of the premises in controversy after the service of any notice in this chapter provided
for, the fact that such notice was not served on such
subtenant shall constitute no defense to the action.
All persons who enter under the tenant after the commencement of the action hereunder shall be bound by
the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action.
1953
78-36-8.

Allegations permitted in complaint —
Time for a p p e a r a n c e — Service of

summons.
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting
forth the facts on which he seeks to recover, may set
forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence
which may have accompanied the alleged forcible
entry, or forcible or unlawful detainer, and claim
damages therefor or compensation for the occupation
of the premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer
charged is after default in the payment of rent, the
complaint shall state the amount of rent due. The
court shall indorse on the summons the number of
days within which the defendant is required to appear and defend the action, which shall not be less
than three or more than 20 days from the date of
service The court may authorize service by publication or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is
complete one week after publication. Service by mail
is complete three days after mailing. The summons
shali be changed in form to conform to the time of
service as ordered, and shall be served as in other
cases.
1987

78-36-8.5

78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alternative remedies.
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint
and the entry of final judgment, the plaintiff may
execute and file a possession bond. The bond may be
in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified
funds, or a property bond executed by two persons
who own real property in the state and who are not
parties to the action. The court shall approve the
bond in an amount that is the probable amount of
costs of suit and damages which may result to the
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted.
The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for
the benefit of the defendant for all costs and damages
actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff
shall notify the defendant that he has filed a possession bond. This notice shall be served in the same
manner as service of summons and shall inform the
defendant of all of the alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2).
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a
possession bond under Subsection (1):
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon nonpayment of rent or
utilities, the existing contract shall remain in
force and the complaint shall be dismissed if the
defendant, within three days of the service of the
notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent,
utility charges, any late fee. and other costs, including attorney's fees, as provided in the rental
agreement.
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if
he executes and files a counter bond in the form
of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds,
or a property bond executed by two persons who
own real property in the state and who are not
parties to the action. The form of the bond is at
the defendant's option. The bond shall be payable
to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file
the bond prior to the expiration of three days
from the date he is served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond. The court shall
approve the bond in an amount that is the probable amount of costs of suit and actual damages
that may result to the plaintiff if the defendant
has improperly withheld possession. The court
shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's total bond.
{a The defendant, upon demand, shall be
granted a hearing to be held prior to the expiration of three days from the date the defendant is
served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond.
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with
a remedy under Subsection (2) within the required
time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be
granted an order of restitution. The constable of the
precinct or the sheriff of the county where the property is situated shall return possession of the property to the plaintiff promptly.
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection (2MC), and if the court rules after the hearing
that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return
possession of the property to the plaintiff. If at the
hearing the court allows the defendant to remain in
possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between the parties, the court shall require the
defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection
(2Kb). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues
between the parties can be adjudicated without fur-
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ther court proceedings, the court shall, upon adjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the merits.
1987

78-36-9. P r o o f required by plaintiff — Defense.
On t h e trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry
or forcible detainer the plaintiff shall only be required to show, in addition to t h e forcible entry or
forcible detainer complained of, that h e was peaceably in t h e actual possession a t t h e time of t h e forcible entry, or was entitled to t h e possession a t t h e
time of the forcible detainer. The defendant may
show in his defense that he or his ancestors, or those
whose interest in such premises he claims, had been
in t h e quiet possession thereof for t h e space of one
whole year continuously next before t h e commencement of the proceedings, and t h a t his interest therein
is not then ended or determined; and such showing is
a bar to the proceedings.
1953
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages,
and rent — Immediate enforcement —
Treble damages.
( D A judgment may be entered upon the merits or
upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the
plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of
the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, or after default in the
payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the
forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
from any of the following:
va) forcible entry;
(b» forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved at trial; and
id) the amount of rent due. if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment of
rent.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the
damages assessed under Subsections (2Ha) through
(2uct, and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are
provided for in the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after
default in the payment of t h e rent, execution upon
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may
be issued and enforced immediately
1987
78-36-11. T i m e for appeal.
Either party may, within ten days, appeal from the
judgment rendered.
1953
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial
process prohibited — Abandoned
premises excepted.
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a
tenant from the tenant's premises in any manner except by judicial process, provided, an owner or his
agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased premises under Subsection
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempting to rent them at a fair rental value when the tenant has abandoned the premises.
1981
78-36-12.3,

Definitions.
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(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from entering into the premises with intent to
deprive the tenant of such entry
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state.
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations:
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that
he or she will be absent from the premises, and
the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence
other than the presence of the tenants personal
property that the tenant is occupying the premises; or
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that
he or she will be absent from the premises, and
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the
tenant's personal property has been removed
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable
evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises.
1981
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking
and rerenting by owner — Liability of
tenant — Personal property of tenant
left on premises.
(' D In the event of abandonment the owner may
retake the premises and attempt to rent them at a
fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the
premises shall be liable:
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of
the term: or
ib) for rent accrued during the period necessary to re-rent the premises at a fair rental
value, plus the difference between the fair rental
value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental
agreement, plus a reasonable commission for the
renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary to restore the rental unit to its condition
when rented by the tenant less normal wear and
tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a) notwithstanding that the owner did not
re-rent the premises
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and
has left personal property on the premises, the owner
is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling,
store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and
storage costs from the tenant. The owner shall make
reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the location
of the personal property; however, if the property has
been in storage for over 30 days and the tenant has
made no reasonable effort to recover it, the owner
may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward
any amount the tenant owes. Any money left over
from the sale of the property shall be handled as specified in Section 78-44-18. Nothing contained in this
act shall be in derogation of or alter the owner's
rights under Chapter 3, Title 38.
19»
CHAPTER 37
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
Section
78-37-1.
78-37-2.
78-37-3.
78-37-4.
78-37-5.

Form of action — Judgment — Special
execution.
Deficiency judgment — Execution.
Necessary parties — Unrecorded rights
barred.
Sales — Disposition of surplus moneys.
Sales — When debt due in installments.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 18

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations
and Clubs §§ 50, 51; 36 Am. Jur. 2d Foreign
Corporations § 193 et seq.; 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent Persons §§ 115tol21;42 Am. Jur.
2d Infants §§ 155 et seq., 175; 59 Am. Jur. 2d
Parties §§ 31, 38 to 44, 249 to 252, 255; 60 Am.
Jur. 2d Partnership § 324.
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Associations §§ 36, 38; 20
C.J.S. Corporations § 1828 et seq.; 21 C.J.S.
Courts § 76; 43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 108, 110; 44
C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 133 to 146; 67 C.J.S.
Parties §§ 17, 18, 133 to 138; 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 206 et seq.
A.L.R. — Power of incompetent spouse's
guardian, committee or next friend to sue for
granting or vacation of divorce or annulment of
marriage, or to make a compromise or settlement in such suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681.
Insurance, proper party plaintiff, under real
party in interest statute, to action against tortfeasor for damage to insured property where
insured has paid part of loss, 13 A.L.R.3d 140.
Insurance, proper party plaintiff, under real
party in interest statute, to action against tortfeasor for damage to insured property where
loss is entirely covered bv insurance, 13
A.L.R.3d 229.
State Consumer Protection Act, right to private action under, 62 A.L.R.3d 169.

Who is minor's next of kin for guardianship
purposes, 63 A.L.R.3d 813.
Bailor's right of direct action against bailee's
theft insurer for loss of bailed property, 64
A.L.R.3d 1207.
Proper party plaintiff in action for injury to
common areas of condominium development,
69 A.L.R.3d 1148.
Condominium, standing to bring action relating to title in real propertv of, 72 A.L.R.3d
314.
Necessary or proper parties to suit or proceeding to establish private boundary line, 73
A.L.R.3d 948.
Necessity of requiring presence in court of
both parties in proceedings relating to custody
or visitation of children, 15 A.L.R.4th 864.
Right of illegitimate child to maintain action
to determine paternity, 19 A.L.R.4th 1082.
Required parties in adoption proceedings, 48
A.L.R.4th 860.
Joint ventures capacity to sue, 56 A.L.R.4th
1234.
Key Numbers. —- Associations «=» 20, 26;
Corporations <^ 662; Courts «= 12; Infants <^>
78, 80; Mental Health «=> 471 to 497; Parties «=
1, 2, 6, 8, 21; Partnerships «=» 191.

Rule 18. Joinder of claims and remedies.
(a) Joinder of claims. The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting
forth a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims
either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party.
There may be a like joinder of claims when there are multiple parties if the
requirements of Rules 19, 20, and 22 are satisfied. There may be a like joinder
of cross-claims or third-party claims if the requirements of Rules 13 and 14
respectively are satisfied.
(b) Joinder of remedies; fraudulent conveyances. Whenever a claim is
one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been prosecuted to a
conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single action; but the court shall
grant relief in that action only in accordance with the relative substantive
rights of the parties. In particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for money and
a claim to have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first
having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially identical to Rule 18, F.R.C.P.
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Rule 54
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PART VII.
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
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file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985).
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3)
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the
appellate court and costs in original proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. For
present provisions, see Rule 34(d) of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court and the Committee
Note thereto, and Rule 34(d) of the Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 54, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — As to costs on appeals, see Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
Continuances, discretion to require payment
of costs, Rule 40(b).
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costs,
§ 49-6-301.
State, pavment of costs awarded against,
§ 78-27-13.
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, Rule
62(h)."
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Absence of express determination.
Amendment of pleadings.
Appeal as of right.
Certification not determinative.
Costs.
—In general.
—Challenge of award.
—Depositions.
—Discretionary.
—Expenses of preparation for action.
—Failure to object.
—Liability of state.
—Service on adverse party.
—Statutory limits.
—Untimely filing of memorandum.
—When not demanded.
Default judgments.
Effect of partial final judgment.
Final order.
—Claims for relief.
—Complete disposal of claim or party.
Inconsistent oral statements.
Interest on judgment.
Judgment based on unpleaded theory.
Judgment in favor of nonparty.

Motion to reconsider.
Pleading in the alternative.
Presumption of finality.
Real party in interest.
Relief not demanded in pleadings.
Specific performance request.
Unpleaded issue tried by consent.
Cited.
Absence of express determination.
In action based on alleged breach of loan
agreement, where trial court improperly dismissed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judgment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judgment on cross-claim and counterclaim would
be subject, on remand, to revision since all
claims presented had not been adjudicated and
since trial court made no express determination as required by this section. M. & S. Constr.
& Eng'g Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah
2d 139, 467 P.2d 410 (1970).
Amendment of pleadings.
The proper application of Rule 15(b) and
Subdivision (c)(1) of this rule, is that amendments should be allowed where a case has actually been tried on a different issue or a differ-
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was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);

Rule 56

J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
t r i a l o r f l l i n g o f ne cessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
^55

§§

^f™ to *fe K n o t i c e °ff a PP l i c a t l ™ J r de[
J^gment where notice is required only
bv
custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=> 92 to 134.

C . j S - S CJ.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to liability against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
2070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

f
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Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
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action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal.
—-Standard of review.
Attorney's fees.

Damages.
Discovery.
Evidence.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.

—Lease as security.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Summary judgment.
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the error was prejudicial to the extent that
there is reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different result.
Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Dav Saints
Hosp., 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1960»;
Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d
406 (1963); Ewell & Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283 (1972);
Redevelopment Agencvv. Mitsui Inv. Inc., 522
P2d 1370 (Utah 1974)
An appellate court will not reverse a judgment for mere error, unless the error involved
is substantial and prejudicial. Kesler v.
Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975).
Trial error corrected in judgment.
A buyer under a conditional sales contract
was not prejudiced by a conclusion of law in
which inadvertently no credit had been given
to him for an amount that was due to him, and
according to which the seller was thus entitled
to a judgment in a certain larger sum. where
the court, in arriving at its judgment, correctly

Rule 62

credited to the buyer the amount that was due
to him, and entered judgment only for the difference. Knudsen Music Co. v. Masterson, 121
Utah 252, 240 P.2d 973 (1952).
„. ,
„
_
T7 t O J
Cl
* £ i n s < * * v Geurts. 11 Utah 2d 345
3 9 p
* -2<* 12 (1961), Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah
2d 364, 412 P 2d 451 (1966); Estate of
McFarland v. Holt 18 Utah 2d 12/, 41/ P.2d
244 (1966); Bank of Pleasant Grove v. Johnson,
j * 2 P-2d 1276 (Utah 1976>; Rigtrupv Straw^ n y * a t e r Users Ass n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah
1 9 7 )
T 7 1 ' Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828
( L t a h 1980) S t a t e x r e l K K H
''
*
' 610 P 2 d 849
(Utah 1980); Chournos v. D'Agnillo. 642 P.2d
710 (Utah 1982); Madesen v. Brown, 701 P.2d
1086 (Utah 1985); Chandler v. Mathews. 734
P.2d 907 (Utah 1987); Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. v. Sohm, 755 P.2d 155 (Utah 1988);
Painter v. Painter. 752 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988); Belden v. Dalbo. Inc., 752 P.2d
1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1988»; King v. Barron, 95
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 702, 776 to 819; 58 Am. Jur. 2d New
Trial § 31.
C.J.S. — 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error
§S 1676 to 1777; 5B C.J.S. Appeal and Error

§§ 1778 to 1800, 1894 to 1907; 66 C.J.S. NewTrial £ 13
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error e=> 1025
to 10*74. 1170; New Trial «=> 27.

Rule 62, Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment.
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution or other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue immediately upon the entry of the judgment,
unless the court in its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the
adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs.
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment. In its discretion and
on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending
the disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment
made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a judgment or order
made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a motion for judgment in accordance with a
motion for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for
amendment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant to Rule
52(b).
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the
court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction
during the pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper
for the security of the rights of the adverse party.
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving a
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing
the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by the court.
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(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. When an appeal is
taken by the United States, the state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either,
or by direction of any department of either, and the operation or enforcement
of the judgment is stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be
required from the appellant.
(0 Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where the defendant is adjudged
guilty of usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding public office, civil or
military, within this state, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed
on an appeal.
(g) Power of appellate court not limited. The provisions in this rule do
not limit any power of an appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to stay
proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to suspend, modify, restore,
or grant an injunction, writ of mandate or writ of prohibition during the
pendency of an appeal or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status
quo or the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered.
(h) Stay of judgment upon multiple claims. When a court has ordered a
final judgment on some but not all of the claims presented in the action under
the conditions stated in Rule 54(b), the court may stay enforcement of that
judgment until the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may
prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the
party in whose favor the judgment is entered.
(i) Excepting to sureties; justification; multiple sureties; deposit in
lieu of bond. The adverse party may except to the sufficiency of the sureties
to the undertaking filed pursuant to the provisions of this rule at any time
within 10 days after written notice of the filing of such undertakings; and,
unless they or other sureties, within 10 days after service of the notice of such
exception, justify before a judge of the court in which the judgment was entered, or the clerk thereof, upon not less than five days' notice to the party
excepting to such sureties of the time and place of justification, execution of
the judgment is no longer stayed. In all cases where the bond required exceeds
$2,000 and there are more than two sureties thereon, they may state in their
affidavits that they are severally worth the amounts for which they agree to
be found if less than that expressed in the undertaking, provided the whole
amount is equivalent to that of two sufficient sureties. In all cases where an
undertaking is required by these rules a deposit in court in the amount of such
undertaking, or such lesser amount as the court may order, is equivalent to
the filing of the undertaking.
(j) Waiver of undertaking. In all cases the parties may by written stipulation waive the requirements of this rule with respect to the filing of a bond or
undertaking.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 62, F R C P .

Cross-References. — Bond for costs on appeal, R. Utah S. Ct.. Rule 6.
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Rule 73

Rule 73. Procedure in taking an appeal.
(a) through (g) [Deleted.]
(h) Appeal from a judgment rendered in a city or justice court. An
appeal may be taken to the district court from a final judgment rendered in a
city or justice court within one month after notice of the entry of such judgment, or within such shorter time as may be provided by law. The party
appealing shall within the time allowed, serve upon the adverse party a notice
of appeal and file the same, together with a copy thereof, either in the court
from which the appeal is taken or in the district court to which the appeal is
taken; provided that such notice shall show on its face the title of the court in
which it is filed. The appeal shall be dismissed by the district court to which
taken upon motion and notice, unless at the time of filing the notice of appeal
the party appealing shall deposit into court the fees required by law to be paid
in connection therewith, including both the fees for the lower court and for
docketing the appeal in the district court.
(i) Notice to be given and fees remitted to other court. Immediately
upon receipt of the notice of appeal and the fees required to be paid, the clerk
of the court in which the appeal is filed shall mail a copy of such notice,
together with the fees required, to the clerk of the other court.
(j) Record to be transmitted. Within ten days after receipt of the notice of
appeal, or a copy thereof, the lower court shall transmit to the clerk of the
district court a certified copy of the docket or register of actions, the original
pleadings, all notices, motions and other papers filed in the case, and the
notice and undertaking on appeal, if filed in the lower court.
(k) Bond on appeal. At the time of filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall file with such notice a bond for costs on appeal in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 73(c), except that the amount of such bond shall be
$100.00. The appellant may likewise, under the condition of Rule 62 and in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 73. relating to appeals to the Supreme
Court, obtain a stay of execution pending an appeal, provided, that any exception to the appellant's sureties shall be made in the district court to which the
appeal is taken and justification of such sureties shall be before the clerk or a
judge of such court.
(1) Dismissal of appeal — Penalty for delay. Failure of the appellant to
take any of the further steps to secure the review of the case, except filing
notice of appeal and depositing the fees therefor, shall not affect the validity of
the appeal but is ground for such action as the district court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. On the trial of the cause on
appeal, if it appears to the court that the appeal was made solely for delay, it
may add to the costs such damages as may be just, not exceeding twenty-five
percent of the judgment appealed from.
(m) [Deleted.]
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1985.)
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to
(g> and Subdivision (m), relating to the notice
of appeal and the required bond, were deleted
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (now the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court), effective January 1, 1985. For
present provisions, see Rules 3, 4, 6 to 8, 11
and 12, R. Utah S. Ct.

Compiler's Notes. — Rule 73(c), referred to
in Subdivision (k), has been repealed. See now
Rule 6, R Utah S. Ct
There is no federal rule covering this subject
matter.
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RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS
TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES.

TITLE IV. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS;
HABEAS CORPUS.

RULE

1. Scope of rules.
2. Suspension of rules.

RULE

19. Extraordinary writs.
20. Habeas corpus proceedings.

TITLE II. APPEALS PROM JUDGMENTS
AND ORDERS.

TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS.

3. Appeal as of right: How taken.
4. Appeal as of right: When taken.
4A. Transfer of case from Supreme Court to
Court of Appeals.
4B. Certification by the Court of Appeals to
the Supreme Court.
4C. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals.
5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory
Orders.
6. Bond for costs on appeal.
7. Security: Proceedings against sureties.
8. Stay or injunction pending appeal.
9. Docketing statement.
10. Motions for summary disposition.
11. The record on appeal.
12. Transmission of the record.
13. Notice of filing by clerk of Court of Appeals.
TITLE III. REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF
ORDERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES,
COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES.

14. Review of administrative orders: How obtained; intervention.
15. Record on review.
16. Filing of record.
17. Stay pending review.
18. Applicability of other rules to review.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Filing and service.
Computation and enlargement of time.
Motions.
Briefs.
Brief of an amicus curiae.
Filing and service of briefs.
Form of briefs, petitions, motions, and
other papers.
Prehearing conference.
Oral argument.
Decision of the court: Dismissal; notice of
decision.
Expedited appeals decided after oral argument without written opinion.
Interest on judgment
Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney fees.
Award of costs.
Petition for rehearing.
Issuance of remittitur.
Suggestion of mootness; voluntary dismissal.
Substitution of parties.
Duties of the clerk.
Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions
and discipline.
INDEX TO RULES.

TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES.
Rule 1. Scope of rules,
(a) Applicability of rules. These rules govern the procedure before the
Utah Court of Appeals in all cases. When these rules provide for a motion or
application to be made in a district, juvenile, or circuit court or an administrative agency, commission, or board, the procedure for making such motion or
application shall be governed by the practice of the district, juvenile, or circuit
court or the administrative agency, commission, or board.
(b) Applicability of rules to review of juvenile or circuit court proceedings. Whenever in these rules reference is made to practice and procedure in appeals or proceedings from an order or judgment of a district court,
said rules shall have equal application, force, and effect with regard to practice and procedure in appeals from orders or judgments from a juvenile or
circuit court.
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(c) Procedure established by statute. If a procedure is provided by state
statute as to the appeal or review of an order of an administrative agency,
commission, or board or an officer of the state which is inconsistent with one
or more of these rules, the statute shall govern. In other respects, these rules
shall apply as to such appeals or reviews.
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules shall not be construed to
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as established by law.
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals and abbreviated R. Utah Ct. App.

Rule 2. Suspension of rules.
In the interest of expediting a decision, the Court of Appeals, on its own
motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the provisions of
Rules 4(a), 4(e), and 5(a), suspend the requirements or provisions of any of
these rules in a particular case and may order proceedings in that case in
accordance with its direction.

TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND
ORDERS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: How taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. As defined and provided by law, an appeal may be taken from the final orders and judgments of a
district court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the Court of Appeals by filing a
notice of appeal with the clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is
taken within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any
step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as the Court of
Appeals deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or
other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or an order and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or join in an appeal of
another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Such joint appeals
may thereafter proceed and be treated as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of the Court of Appeals
on its own motion, on motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as
the appellant and the adverse party as the respondent. The title of the action
or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the Court of Appeals. In original proceedings in the
Court of Appeals, the party making the original application shall be known as
the plaintiff and any other party as the defendant.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or
part thereof, appealed from; shall name the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate that the appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals.
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proceedings subsequent to the granting of the petition shall be as, and within
the time required, for appeals from final judgments.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership
v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);

OK Motors, Inc. v. Hill, 762 P.2d 1102 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

Rule 6. Bond for costs on appeal.
At the time of filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall file with such
notice a bond for costs on appeal, unless such bond is waived in writing by the
adverse party or unless an affidavit as hereinafter described is filed. The bond
shall be in the sum of at least $300.00 or such greater amount as the court
from which the appeal is taken may order on motion of the respondent to
ensure payment of costs on appeal. No separate bond for costs on appeal is
required when a supersedeas bond is filed. The bond on appeal shall be with
sufficient sureties and shall be conditioned to secure payment of costs if the
appeal is dismissed, the judgment is reversed or affirmed, or the judgment is
modified. The adverse party may except to the sufficiency of the sureties in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 62(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If
the appellant makes and files with the clerk of the court from which the
appeal is taken an affidavit in the form set out in U.C.A., 1953, § 21-7-3, as
amended, no bond on appeal shall be required. This rule shall have no application in a criminal case.

Rule 7. Security: Proceedings against sureties.
Whenever these rules require or permit the giving of security by a party
and security is given in the form of a bond or stipulation or other undertaking
with one or more sureties, each surety must consent therein to the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the surety by the court from which the appeal is
taken and must irrevocably appoint the clerk of that court as the surety's
agent upon whom any papers affecting the surety's liability on the bond or
undertaking may be served. The surety's liability may be enforced on motion
without the necessity of an independent action. The motion and such notice of
the motion as the court from which the appeal is taken prescribes may be
served on the clerk of that court, who shall forthwith mail copies to the sureties if their addresses are known.

Rule 8. Stay or injunction pending appeal.
(a) Stay must ordinarily be sought in first instance in district court,
juvenile court, or circuit court; motion for stay in Court of Appeals.
Application for a stay of the judgment or order of a district court, juvenile
court, or circuit court pending appeal, for approval of a supersedeas bond, or
for an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal must ordinarily be made in the first instance in
the court from which the appeal is taken. A motion for such relief may be
made to the Court of Appeals, but the motion shall show that application to
the district court, juvenile court, or circuit court for the relief sought is not
practicable or that such court has denied an application or has failed to afford
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Rule 9

the relief which the applicant requested, with the reasons given by that court
for its action. The motion shall also show the reasons for the relief requested
and the facts relied upon, and if the facts are subject to dispute, the motion
shall be supported by affidavits or other sworn statements or copies thereof.
With the motion shall be filed such parts of the record as are relevant. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be given to all parties. The motion shall be filed
with the clerk and normally will be considered by a panel of the court, but in
exceptional cases where such procedure would be impracticable due to the
requirements of time, the application may be made to and considered by a
single judge of the court subject to review by a panel.
(b) Stay may be conditioned upon giving of bond. Relief available in
the Court of Appeals under this rule may be conditioned upon the filing of a
bond or other appropriate security in the court from which an appeal is
sought.
(c) Stays in criminal cases. Stays in criminal cases pending appeal to the
court are governed and shall be had in accordance with U.C.A., 1953,
§ 77-35-27, as amended (Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure).
Advisory Committee Note. — The requirements that must be met under Section
77-35-27, Utah R. Crim. P. 27, to obtain a certificate of probable cause, which is necessary to

admit the defendant to bail or release pending
appeal, have been delineated in State v.
Neeley, 707 P.2d 647 (Utah 1985).

Rule 9. Docketing statement.
(a) Filing. Within 21 days after a notice of appeal or a petition for review is
filed, the appellant or the petitioner shall file the original of a docketing
statement, together with five copies and proof of service, with the clerk of the
Court of Appeals if the case is subject to the exclusive original appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Docketing statements in cases which may
be transferred to the Court of Appeals for decision shall be filed with the clerk
of the Supreme Court unless an order transferring the case to the Court of
Appeals has been entered.
(b) Purpose of docketing statement. The docketing statement is not a
brief and should not contain arguments or procedural motions. It is to be used
by the court in classifying cases for determining the priority to be accorded a
case and in making certifications to the Supreme Court, summary dispositions, and calendar assignments.
(c) Content of docketing statement. The docketing statement shall contain the following information in the order set forth below:
(1) The date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed; the date of
all motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), or 59, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure; the date and effect of all orders disposing of such
motions; and the date the notice of appeal or the petition for review was
filed.
(2) The specific rule or statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on
the Court of Appeals to decide the appeal, the petition for review, or in the
case of an interlocutory appeal, the date of the court order allowing the
appeal and the issues which may be appealed pursuant to the granting of
the interlocutory appeal. Particular attention should be paid to the requirements of Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if an appeal is
from an order in a multiple-party or a multiple-claim case.
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peals or proceedings from an order or judgment of a district court, said rules
shall have equal application, force and effect with regard to practice and
procedure in appeals from orders or judgments from a juvenile court.
(c) Procedure established by statute. If a procedure is provided by state
statute as to the appeal or review of an order of an administrative agency,
commission, board, or officer of the state which is inconsistent with one or
more of these rules, the statute shall govern. In other respects, these Rules
shall apply as to such appeals or reviews.
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules shall not be construed to
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as established by law.
(e) Title, These rules shall be known as the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court and abbreviated R. Utah S. Ct.
(Amended, effective April 20, 1987.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph
(a), (c). These rules are applicable to appeals
from a district court and a juvenile court and
from appeals or reviews of an administrative
agency, commission or board.
These rules are applicable to and govern
practice and procedure in criminal as well as in
civil cases. While $ 77-35-26 Utah Code Ann.
1953, as amended (Rule 26 Ctah Code of Criminal Procedure) provides for appeals to the supreme court from district and circuit courts,
the procedure and practice for taking such appeals, including the time in which the appeal is
filed, shall be prescribed by these rules. These
rules do not alter, change, or abridge the substantive rights of a defendant or the state in
criminal cases before the court.
Upon the effective date of these rules, if a
statute provides for a procedure of appeal from
a district or lower court to the supreme court
which is inconsistent or in conflict with these
rules, the rules shall control. Section 78-2-4
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. However,
as set forth in paragraph ic), if a method or
manner of appeal or review of an order of a
state administrative agency, commission,

board or officer provided by Utah statute is inconsistent or in conflict with any of these rule9,
the statute shall govern.
Paragraph (b). This paragraph makes it
clear that these rules apply to appellate practice and procedure before the supreme court in
appeals and proceedings from orders and judgments of a juvenile court. Section 78-3a-51
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. Whenever
the terms "district court" or "clerk of the district court" are used in these rules they shall
be interchangeable with the terms "juvenile
court" and "clerk of the juvenile court" as they
relate to appellate practice and procedure before the supreme court in juvenile court proceedings.
Amendment Notes. —- The 1987 amendment substituted "Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court and abbreviated R. Utah S. Ct." for
"Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, or abbreviated U.R.A.P." in Subdivision (e).
Cross-References. — Criminal cases, appeals, § 77-35-26.
Rulemaking power of Supreme Court,
§ 78-2-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction.
Scope of review.
Jurisdiction.
These rules do not confer jurisdiction. Greg-

ory v. Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 735 P.2d 33
(Utah 1987).
Scope of review.
The Supreme Court has its broadest scope of
appellate review in an appeal from the exercise
of equity powers. State ex rel. L.G.W., 641 P.2d
127 (Utah 1982).
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Rule 6

Procedure. If the appellant makes and files with the clerk of the court from
which the appeal is taken, an affidavit in the form set out in § 21-7-3, Utah
Code Ann. 1953 as amended, no bond on appeal shall be required. This rule
shall have no application in a criminal case.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule requires the appellant to file a cost bond at the
same time the notice of appeal is filed, unless
the respondent waives the requirement, or unless the appellant files an affidavit of
impecuniosity. Section 21-7-3 Utah Code Ann.
1953, as amended. The purpose of the cost bond
is to give the respondent security for the payment of such costs as may be awarded to him
under the provisions of Rule 33 in the event
that the appellant is unsuccessful in his appeal. This rule is essentially derived from former Rule 73(c) and (d), and does not represent
a substantial modification of current practice.

Corresponding Rule 7 FRAP leaves the matter of the posting of a cost bond to the discretion of the district court. However, the committee was concerned that, if Utah were to follow
the federal format, the district court would be
subjected to numerous motions seeking to set
the amount of a cost bond on a case by case
basis. Accordingly, the committee concluded
that the better approach would be to presumptively require a $300 cost bond, but allow the
respondent to request that a higher amount be
required in a particular case.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Compiler's Notes. — The cases annotated
under this rule interpreted the provisions of
former Rules 72 to 76, U.R.C.P.
ANALYSIS

Failure to file.
Supersedeas bond.
—Adequacy.
—Damages.
Speculative.
—When required.
When filed.
Failure to file.
Failure to file an appeal bond is not jurisdictional, although it may be grounds for dismissal of an appeal in appropriate circumstances.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin,
Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258
(Utah 1984).
Supersedeas bond.
—Adequacy.
A motion to dismiss an appeal due to inadequacies of plaintiffs' supersedeas bond is a matter which calls for a factual determination, and
necessitates the taking of evidence. Because
the Supreme Court will not take evidence, it
will direct the district court to take any evidence it may deem appropriate and to rule
upon the question as to the adequacy of the

supersedeas bond. Swasev v. Rockey Point
Ditch Co., 649 P.2d 1 (Utah 1982).
—Damages.
Speculative.
Plaintiffs' contention that they were entitled, as the amount for the defendant's use and
detention of property during appeal, to the
rental value of the land for agricultural purposes they intended to use land for, when in
fact the land was undeveloped sagebrush
ground at the time a supersedeas bond was
filed, was akin to a claim made for loss of prospective profits which were too uncertain and
speculative to form a basis for recovery. Jenkins v. Morgan, 123 Utah 480, 260 P.2d 532
(1953).
—When required.
An appellant is not bound to furnish a supersedeas bond; rather, it is only necessary if the
appellant wishes to restrain the successful
party and the lower court from taking affirmative action to enforce a judgment or decree.
Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d
1244 (Utah 1979).
When filed.
Court has discretion to allow the bond to be
filed subsequent to the procedural time where
no prejudice is shown to the respondent. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright &
Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984).
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request for discovery of testimony of witnesses
before grand jury. Granato v. Salt Lake County
Grand Jury, 557 P.2d 750 (Utah 1976).

tent with thoroughness and efficiency in the
administration of justice. Manwill v. Oyler, 11
Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961).

Determination
regarding
substantial
rights.
Where plaintiff sued for injuries suffered
when her son's car, in which she was riding,
collided with a cow which had fallen on highway from defendant's truck, preliminary order
by the trial court that unlawful loading of the
truck was negligence as a matter of law and
that the trial should be held only on the issue
of damages involved substantial rights of the
parties and would materially affect the final
decision and, therefore, was subject to an intermediate appeal. Klafla v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d
65, 404 P.2d 659 (1965).

When to grant
The desired objective of efficiency in procedure can be promoted, and an interlocutory appeal is properly granted, if it appears essential
to adjudicate principles of law or procedure in
advance as a necessary foundation upon which
the trial may proceed, or if there is a high likelihood that the litigation can be finally disposed of on such an appeal. Manwill v. Oyler,
11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961).
Whenever it appears likely that the matters
in dispute can be finally disposed of upon a
trial, or where they may become moot, or
where they can, without involving any serious
difficulty, abide determination in the event of
an appeal after the trial, the desired objective
of efficient administration of justice is best
served by refusing to entertain an interlocutory appeal and letting the case proceed to
trial. Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361
P.2d 177 (1961).
Where defendant landowner, by motion to
dismiss the complaint, challenged the plaintiffs authority to condemn defendant's land
and such motion was denied, an appropriate
situation for intermediate appeal was presented since determination of the issue raised
by the motion might eliminate the necessity
for further proceedings or trial. Great Salt
Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d
45, 414 P.2d 963 (1966).

Irreparable damage.
Temporary order allocating water usage by
plaintiff pending further study by court raised
sufficient issue of irreparable damage pending
the filing of the final order fixing and decreeing the water rights of the respective parties as
to be appealable. In re Water Rights, 10 Utah
2d 77, 348 P.2d 679 (1960).
Order vacating summary judgment.
A party does not have an appeal as a matter
of right from an order vacating a summary
judgment but may seek an appeal pursuant to
Subdivision (a). Jensen v. Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d
23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968).
Purpose in granting.
The purpose to be served in granting an interlocutory appeal is to get directly at and dispose of the issues as quickly as possible, consis-

Cited in All Weather Insulation, Inc. v.
Amiron Dev. Corp., 702 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error ^ 50 to 64.
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error *§ 92 et
seq.

Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error * >66et
seq.

Rule 6. Bond for costs on appeal.
At the time of filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall file with such
notice a bond for costs on appeal, unless such bond is waived in writing by the
adverse party, or unless an affidavit as hereinafter described is filed. The bond
shall be in the sum of at least $300.00, or such greater amount as the district
court may order on motion of the respondent to ensure payment of costs on
appeal. No separate bond for costs on appeal is required when a supersedeas
bond is filed. The bond on appeal shall be with sufficient sureties and shall be
conditioned to secure payment of costs if the appeal is dismissed or the judgment affirmed, or of such costs as the Supreme Court may award if the judgment is modified. The adverse party may except to the sufficiency of the
sureties in accordance with the provisions of Rule 62(i), Utah Rules of Civil
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 323 to 344.
C.J.S. — 4A C J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 499
to 573.
A.L.R. — Measure and amount of damages

recoverable under supersedeas bond in action
involving recovery or possession of real estate,
9 A.L.R.3d 330.
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error *» 369
to 395.

Rule 7. Security; proceedings against sureties.
Whenever these rules require or permit the giving of security by a party,
and security is given in the form of a bond or stipulation or other undertaking
with one or more sureties, each surety must consent therein to the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over him by the district court and must irrevocably appoint the clerk of the district court as his agent upon whom any papers affecting his liability on the bond or undertaking may be served. His liability may
be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action. The
motion and such notice of the motion as the district court prescribes may be
served on the clerk of the district court who shall forthwith mail copies to the
sureties if their addresses are known.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule
provides that the surety on a bond submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the district court,
and appoints the clerk of the district court as
e s agent for service of process of any papers
affecting the surety's liability on the bond. The
rule also makes it clear that the liability of the
surety may be enforced on motion, without the

necessity of an independent action. Prior practice under Rule 73(f) URCivP is generally
maintained.
The district court in question will presuma bly be that from which the case was appealed,
e x c e p t i n c a s e s o f o n g i n a i actions, in which
c a s e g < t r a d i t l o n a l v e n U e concepts should apply,

Rule 8. Stay or injunction pending appeal.
(a) Stay must ordinarily be sought in the first instance in district
court; motion for stay in Supreme Court. Application for a stay of the
judgment or order of a district court pending appeal, or for approval of a
supersedeas bond, or for an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal must ordinarily be made
in the first instance in the district court. A motion for such relief may be made
to the Supreme Court, but the motion shall show that application to the
district court for the relief sought is not practicable, or that the district court
has denied an application, or has failed to afford the relief which the applicant
requested, with the reasons given by the district court for its action. The
motion shall also show the reasons for the relief requested and the facts relied
upon, and if the facts are subject to dispute the motion shall be supported by
affidavits or other sworn statements or copies thereof. With the motion shall
be filed such parts of the record as are relevant. Reasonable notice of the
motion shall be given to all parties. The motion shall be filed with the clerk
and normally will be considered by the court, but in exceptional cases where
such procedure sould be impracticable due to the requirements of time, the
application may be made to and considered by a single justice of the court.
lb) Stay must be conditional upon giving of bond. Relief available in
the Supreme Court under this rule may be conditioned upon the filing of a
bond or other appropriate security in the district court.
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June 20, 1988

Mr. Wesley Sine
WASATCH BOWLING
640 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
LETTER OF AGREEMENT
Dear Mr. Sine:
Pursuant to the letter dated 3/31/88 from David R. Kocherhans, Property Manager
for Coldwell Banker Real Estate Management Services, pertaining to reduction in
rent the following is what Richard Skankey has agreed to:
1)

Monthly rent shall be reduced to $4,000.00 versus 10% of the
gross receipts whichever is greater beginning April 1, 1988,
mo*!*1

im^-

2)

Monthly rent shall include all CAM charges which are approximately
$2,500.00 per month.

3)

Merchants dues will remain at SI50.00 per month.

4)

Monthly payment on the Pxanissory Note dated October 12, 1987 shall be
reduced from $1,200.00 per month to $580.00 per month, interest only.

This agreement will extend for the period of two years to March 31, 1990 at the
end of which time the regular lease payments will resume and at this time also
the full amount of the Promissory Note will be due and payable.

^7-a-&
Richard Skankey / Date

Vcslcy Sine / Date <
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JOSEPH C. RUST (2835)
SCOTT 0. MERCER (3834)
KESLER & RUST
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-9333
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER,
LIMITED, a Utah limited
partnership,

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
CIVIL NO. C87-8427
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

WASATCH BOWLING, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.

Plaintiff complains of defendant and alleges:
1.

Plaintiff is a duly registered Utah limited partnership

doing business at all times material hereto in Salt Lake County,
Utah.
2.

Defendant Wasatch Bowling, Inc. is a Utah corporation

having its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.

-1-

3.

On or about the 10th day of September, 1984, defendant

entered into a written Lease Agreement with plaintiff under which
defendant agreed to lease certain real property in the Olympus
Hills Shopping Center located at 4015 South Wasatch Blvd., Salt
lake City, Utah.

A true and accurate copy of said L€>ase

Agreement is attached to plaintiff's original complaint as
Exhibit "A" and by this reference made a part hereof.
4.

Pursuant to the terms of said Lease Agreememt,

defendant agreed to pay rent at the rate of $2,750.00 per month,
common area maintenance charges and other assessments throughout
the ten-year term of the lease.
5.

On or about July 13, 1988, plaintiff and defendant

signed a letter of agreement, a true and correct copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference made a part
hereof.
6.

Defendant has failed to make payments due to plaintiff

under the terms of the said September 10, 1984 lease agreement or
the July 13, 1988 letter of agreement.
7.

Plaintiff is entitled to the immediate restitution of

the subject premises and to payment of all amounts due under the
terms of the September 10, 1984 lease agreement, as amended, in
the amount of $140,990.54.

-2-

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against defendant as
follows:
1.

For the issuance of a Writ of Restitution to restore

possession of the premises to the plaintiff and to evict the
defendant,
2.

For past-due rent and other charges accruing under the

lease as amended in the total amount of $140,990.54,
3.

For reasonable attorney's fees.

4.

For such other damages as may be allowed under the

Lease Agreement as amended or under law as may be more
specifically proved at the time of trial hereon or at a later
date.
5.

For costs of suit incurred herein, interest and such

other further relief as the court may deem proper.
DATED this

day of December, 1988.
KESLER & RUST

mlAUA

Sc6tt 0. Mercer
Attorneys for Plaintiff

1:comp.sine
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June 20, J 988

Mr. Wesley Sine
WASATCH BOWLING
640 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
LETTER OF AGREEMENT
Dear Mr. Sine:
Pursuant to the letter dated 3/31/88 from David R. Kocherhans, Property Manager
for Coldwell Banker Real Estate Management Services, pertaining to reduction in
rent the following is what Richard Skankey has agreed to:
1)

Monthly rent shall be reduced to $4,000,00 versus 10% of th<$
gross receipts whichever is greater beginning April 1, 1988.
mowrt

im^

2)

Monthly rent shall include all CAM charges which are approximately
$2,500,00 per month.

3)

Merchants dues will remain at $150.00 per month.

4)

Monthly payment on the Promissory Note dated October 12, 1987 shall be
reduced from $1,200.00 per month to $580.00 per month, interest only.

This agreement will extend for the period of two years to March 3J, 1990 at the
end of which time the regular lease payments will resume and at this time also
the full amount of the Promissory Note will be due and payable.

7-Q-80
Richard Skankey / Date

/csley Sine / Date
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JOSEPH C. RUST (2835)
SCOTT 0. MERCER (3834)
KESLER & RUST
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-9333
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER,
LIMITED, a Utah limited
partnership,

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
WASATCH BOWLING, INC., a Utah
corporation,

CIVIL NO. C87-8427
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment came on for
hearing before the Honorable Judge Homer F. Wilkinson on Friday,
April 14, 1989 at the hour of 10:00 a.m., plaintiff appearing by
and through its counsel of record, Scott 0. Mercer of Kesler &
Rust, and defendant appearing by and through its counsel of
record, Ronald C. Barker.

The court, having reviewed plaintiff's

motion for partial summary judgment, the supporting memorandum,
the affidavit of Lauren B. Hunt and the opposing memorandum of
defendant, and having heard the argument of counsel, and good
cause appearing, it is hereby
-1-

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment be and is hereby granted in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant, and that a writ of restitution
issue from the clerk of the court restoring possession of the
subject premises to plaintiff Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd.
and evicting defendant Wasatch Bowling, Inc. and all others
occupying the said premises by, through or under defendant
forthwith, which premises are more particularly described as
Wasatch Bowling Lanes, 4015 South Wasatch Boulevard, Holladay,
Utah.

Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, the court expressly determines that there is no just
reason for delay and hereby directs the entry of this partial
summary judgment as a final judgment.

At a later date, the court

may determine the amount of rent and other expenses due under the
lease agreement.
DATED this X %~

day of

^?b~-^^

, 1989.

BY THE COURT

By~Z^Z.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby declare that I caused to be hand-delivered a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Partial Summary Judgment in
Civil No. C-87-8427, this / /

day of April, 1989, to:

Ronald C. Barker, Esq.
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692

y ^ ^

1:parsumju.sine
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